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The Nature of DNA
Dan L. Burk
AbsTrAcT
In the pending case Myriad Genetics v. Association for Molecular Pathology, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will consider the patentability of human genes under the “product of 
nature” doctrine.  Patentable subject matter is generally held to encompass materials 
and artifacts created by humans, and not that which exists independently in nature. 
However, it is not clear that this is a meaningful or helpful distinction.  Given on one 
hand that the concept of a gene is a human construct, and on the other hand that 
all human creations are drawn from the material environment, the question of gene 
patenting is better addressed as a matter of innovation policy than of imponderable 
labeling.
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Like me, this pipe so fragrant burning 
Is made of naught but earth and clay; 
To earth I too shall be returning. 
It falls and, ere I’d think to say, 
It breaks in two before my eyes; 
In store for me a like fate lies.1 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 30, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,2 agreeing to 
hear arguments on the single question, “Are human genes patentable?”3  The 
case concerns patent claims to DNA molecules, some isolated from human cells 
(gDNA) and some constructed in the laboratory (cDNA), which have been chal-
lenged as constituting unpatentable subject matter.  A trial court ruling initially 
found both types of molecules to be unpatentable “products of nature.”4  A panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this holding, both 
on initial appeal and after the case was remanded from the Supreme Court for re-
consideration in light of other recent Supreme Court holdings.5 
In this Essay I consider a particular strain of argument that has grown up dur-
ing the progress of the case, involving unproductive formulations of patent law’s 
product of nature doctrine.  The Supreme Court has held that U.S. patent law en-
compasses “anything under the sun that is made by man”;6 the inverse proposition 
would imply that patent law does not cover anything under the sun not made by 
man.  This leaves the problem, of which the Supreme Court’s question is a partic-
ular version, as to how we might recognize which entities constitute products of 
nature rather than products of inventive human activity.  I hope here to refocus 
the discussion away from the misleading and unhelpful “product of nature” label, 
which is otherwise bound to obfuscate the discussion before the Supreme Court, 
as it has done in the lower courts. 
  
1. J.S. Bach, Edifying Thoughts of a Tobacco Smoker, in THE BACH READER 97 (Hans T. David & 
Arthur Mendel eds., 1966). 
2. 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
(U.S. Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 12-398), 2012 WL 4502947. 
4. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (AMP I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181, 227–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
5. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (AMP II), 689 F.3d 1303, 
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
6. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952)). 
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I. PRODUCTS OF NATURE 
We should begin by recognizing the simple and obvious proposition that 
genes don’t exist in nature.  There is no entity in nature that comes with a label 
declaring “This is a gene,” or even with some type of pointer declaring “Gene 
starts here” or “Gene ends there.”  What exist in nature, in the physical environ-
ment, are diverse globs of material interacting in highly complex networks of en-
ergy transfer.7  Dividing those networks into conceptual bits such as genes is a 
practice that is useful to humans, but not one that is somehow mandated by the 
structure of the universe.  The divisions are determined by humans as part of our 
penchant for “sorting things out.”8 
So it is no sense acting as if the category of genes, or for that matter any given 
gene, is in a fundamental sense ever anything but the product of human invention.  
The concept of a gene is entirely a human construct, and there is considerable 
room for debate as to what ought to be included in the concept of the gene, or, 
by the same token, what ought to be excluded from the concept of the gene.9  
Some such constructs are more useful to humans than others, but the constructs 
themselves change over time, resulting in what we term scientific progress—we 
add or revise or amend the criteria for our constructs, subject to an array of social 
choices that yield amended or revised or additional outcomes.  This is not to say 
that the decision to lay down a marker is arbitrary—or at least that it is typically 
not, and never is entirely, arbitrary; but inclusion or exclusion of the features con-
sidered relevant changes depending on the question being asked and the purpose 
being pursued. 
Thus science informs—but cannot answer—the legal question as to whether 
a gene is a product of nature.  The concept of the gene itself has long been the sub-
ject of ongoing and lively technical debate which may seem obscured by technical 
terminology.  Does a gene include only the series of nucleotide bases that code for 
a gene product—for a protein or for RNA?  Or does the gene include the base se-
quences that control transcription of the coding portion?  Do certain technical 
designations, such as operon or cistron define the gene?10  Does the gene include 
the noncoding portions—the intervening sequences—that in eukaryotes are ex-
  
7. See Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 587 (2006). 
8. See generally GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: 
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2000) (discussing the social structure of classifica-
tion systems). 
9. See, e.g., JOCELYN E. KREBS ET AL., LEWIN’S GENES X 4, 27–28 (2011) (describing historical 
variations on the definition of the gene). 
10. A cistron is a genetic sequence characterized by its potential for mutation.  Id. at 29–30.  An operon 
is a series of coding sequences under the control of a single regulatory sequence.  Id. at 737. 
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cised out of the RNA transcript?  Does the gene include associated macromole-
cules, such as the proteins that transcribe the DNA, or unwind it, or hold it stable 
while it is being replicated or transcribed?  Does it include the DNA sequences 
that code for and control the transcription and translation of those proteins?  Does 
it include the molecules—some macromolecules, some small molecules—that 
switch the coding regions on and off in response to cell stimuli, or the array of cel-
lular machinery that produces such signaling molecules? 
This series of questions should demonstrate that the concept of gene is not 
monolithic.  Each of these technical queries asks us to look a little beyond the frame 
previously chosen for our viewpoint, and in each case the picture entirely changes.  
This has essentially nothing to do with the character of the universe—only with 
the character of human inquiry.  To take only one example, early investigators of the 
gene were surprised to discover that certain genetic sequences—dubbed “enhanc-
ers”—seemed to increase transcription of coding regions, even though these en-
hancer sequences were very far removed from the coding region—often millions of 
base pairs away, along the DNA strand of the chromosome.11  It had been thought 
that sequences belonging to a given gene must be contiguous, or at least near to 
one another.  It was unclear how enhancers could be part of the gene when they 
were located away from what was thought of as the gene. 
As it turns out, the enhancers were in fact physically near to the coding re-
gion because of the intricate folded structure of the chromosome—in three-
dimensional space, pieces of the gene may be near to one another without being 
contiguous along the linear DNA strand.12  In other words, the puzzle of the en-
hancer’s effects was a conceptual artifact created by a fixation on the nucleotide se-
quence of the strand—on what we term the molecule’s “primary” structure.  But 
when science moved past that fixation, to consider the other characteristics of what 
might be included in the gene, the apparent separation between enhancers and 
coding regions was no longer a puzzle.  Enhancer sequences interact with coding 
sequences whether or not they fit our notions of how DNA ought to act; the only 
question for us is whether or not we take account of them in defining what we call 
the gene. 
As Jacob Bronowski was fond of saying, in science there are no facts, only 
judgments.13  Every scientific fact is fundamentally a scientific judgment as to 
what matters in a given instance and what doesn’t.  This is unquestionably true of 
the entities we label genes.  Someone in any given instance has judged that the nu-
  
11. JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 601 (6th ed. 2008). 
12. Id. at 602. 
13. See JACOB BRONOWSKI, The Abacus and the Rose: A New Dialogue on Two World Systems, in 
SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 77, 88–91 (rev. ed. 1965). 
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cleic acid residues up to this certain point should be included, and those beyond 
that point should be excluded; or has judged that this set of molecules is important, 
and the remaining molecules are unimportant—at least to the question under con-
sideration.  And of course when someone decides to include additional residues 
beyond the old cut-off point, or to consider a group of molecules formerly consid-
ered unimportant, then our picture of the universe, and our picture of nature, 
changes. 
II. THE NATURE OF PRODUCTS 
Viewing the same issue through the other end of the telescope, it should be 
clear that all human artifacts are in some sense products of nature.  As the epi-
graph from Bach quoted at the beginning of this Essay reminds us, everything we 
produce—pipes, computers, recombinant plasmids, breakfast cereals, nectarines, 
Saran Wrap,14 Velcro15—is a product drawn from elements of the material world; 
all embody and conform to the same fundamental physical laws of motion, gravi-
tation, conservation, symmetry, relativity, thermodynamics, and electromagnetism.  
Human artifacts (and humans) are drawn from nature and return to nature in one 
form or another.  Indeed, I am not entirely certain what it means to say that the 
products of human activity are ever not a part of nature; beavers build dams, bees 
build hives, and humans build semiconductor chips.  It’s all quite natural. 
The perverse corollary to this truth is that the product of nature doctrine in-
vites its devotees to indulge in a mad search for some aspect of an invention that 
might be considered unnatural.  It should come as no surprise that the primary fo-
cus of the arguments presented in AMP have centered upon finding some aspect 
of the DNA molecules that might be considered man made.  For example, both 
parties disputed the significance of the differences between genomic coding re-
gions and the sequence as found in the complementary DNA (cDNA), which is 
derived from RNA transcripts.16  Eukaryotic coding sequences typically have long 
  
14. See CARL REINER & MEL BROOKS, 2000 Year Old Man, in THE COMPLETE 2000 YEAR OLD 
MAN (Rhino Records 1994) (declaring Saran Wrap “the greatest thing mankind ever devised”). 
15. See David Kronke, 2,034—And Still Ticking: Comedy: Rhino Releases a Boxed-Set of Albums With 
the 2,000 Year Old Man. ‘I Listened to the Last Record Yesterday, and It’s Still Funny,’ Carl Reiner Says 
of the Routines He Did With Mel Brooks, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1994, http://articles.latimes.com/ 
1994-05-27/entertainment/ca-62989_1_carl-reiner (quoting Mel Brooks: “Velcro is state-of-the-
art, Velcro can kick Saran Wrap’s ass . . . . [I]t’s the only thing in the last 30 years I like as much.”). 
16. cDNAs are DNA sequences artificially derived from reverse transcription of messenger RNAs 
(mRNAs), which are the gene product of most coding gene sequences.  See WATSON ET AL., 
supra note 11, at 749.  Because cDNAs are derived from mRNA, they correspond to the sequence 
of the RNA, rather than to the sequence of the genomic DNA from which the RNA is derived.  
KREBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 82–83.  The transcription is termed “reverse” because transcription 
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intervening sequences, or introns, that are not included in the production of RNA 
transcripts, and so appear in the native coding sequence, but are not in reverse tran-
scribed into the cDNA that is generally used in the laboratory.17 
Myriad, defending its cDNA patents, therefore argued at trial and before the 
Federal Circuit that its cDNA sequences, lacking introns, could not possibly be 
products of nature, but rather were the product of human-designed reverse tran-
scription.  The trial judge attempted to gloss over this rather stark difference by 
holding that the informational content of the native genomic and complementary 
molecules is the same, making the cDNAs equivalent to naturally occurring 
DNA.18  The Federal Circuit unanimously rejected this distinction by focusing 
instead on the structural differences between the cDNA Myriad claimed and DNA 
found in the wild.  All the Federal Circuit judges agreed that the cDNAs were 
structurally different from native molecules; the disagreement was over the suffi-
ciency of structural difference in the genomic or gDNA molecules. 
Judge Alan D. Lourie, a classically trained chemist, writing for the majority 
noted and relied upon the covalent bonds that are missing in the laboratory ver-
sion of the gDNA molecule.  In its native state, the nucleotide sequence is bonded 
to the remainder of the chromosome.  In its isolated laboratory state, the unat-
tached DNA is left with free electron pairs that thermodynamically must attach 
to something, and that typically adopt stray hydrogen atoms for bonding.19  This 
unquestionably alters the structure of the molecule from that in the wild, not simp-
ly because there are vast stretches of nucleotides on each side that are missing, but 
because the atoms that assume those positions create a different physical shape. 
In dissent, Judge William C. Bryson accused Judge Lourie of focusing on 
structural differences too inconsequential to make the molecules unnatural—that 
is, to make them the product of human intervention.20  But if Judge Lourie’s dis-
tinctions seem trivial, it is only because of a naïve focus on the similarities of nu-
cleotide sequence that he shared with the rest of the panel, and indeed with the trial 
court—the same kind of preoccupation with primary structure that led to the 
  
of DNA from RNA is contrary to the usual paradigm of transcription in living cells.  Id. at 15; 
WATSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 340.  The enzymes used for the process are derived from 
certain viruses that have RNA genomes, and so they routinely follow a “reverse” transcription 
model.  KREBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 440–41. 
17. WATSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 415. 
18. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 228–30 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
19. See AMP II, 689 F.3d 1303, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also KREBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 8 
(describing the free 5’ (“5-prime”) and 3’ (“3-prime”) termini of nucleotide chains); WATSON ET 
AL., supra note 11, at 104. 
20. AMP II, 689 F.3d at 1351 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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supposed puzzle of enhancer sequences.21  Nucleotide sequence is only important 
to the extent that it contributes the physical configuration of the molecule, and if 
one is looking for differences, the differences between the native and laboratory 
molecules are even more numerous and significant than Judge Lourie imagined. 
In its native environment, the constrained helical DNA molecule quite lit-
erally ties itself into knots.22  This same effect can easily be seen in the handset 
cords of desktop telephone sets; the cords are generally helical, and inevitably coil 
themselves into tangles when the handset is replaced into the cradle after a few 
calls.  The only feasible way to unwind the cord is to release the constraints on the 
cord by dangling the handset and allowing it to spin freely.  DNA winds itself into 
coils in exactly the same fashion.  This coiled structure of the helix, whether seen 
in telephone cords or in macromolecules, can be mathematically described as two 
variables termed the twist and writhe of the strand.23 
In the molecule’s natural state, this molecular tangling is constrained by a lat-
tice of scaffolding proteins, as well as by ambient globular proteins that hold the 
strands open, closed, or stable depending on the state of a given molecular func-
tion, such as transcription or replication.24  These associated structures do not ac-
company the nucleotide strand into artificial settings such as the laboratory; the 
structural constraints are removed during the extraction process, and are of course 
never present for molecules generated by artificially initiated reverse transcription.  
Judge Lourie is correct that snipping a piece out of the chromosome makes a dif-
ference, but it is not simply in the bonds at the ends of the strand; the twist and 
writhe found in the wild are eliminated. 
A DNA molecule outside the cellular environment is in fact characterized 
by a large number of other differences—the pitch (or “wind”) of the helix, the ionic 
shell surrounding the molecule, the charge of the phosphate backbone of the mol-
ecule, the manner in which the molecule folds or “sticks” to itself and other mole-
cules—depending on the medium in which it is immersed.  Indeed, laboratory 
conditions such as pH—acidity—and buffer composition are generally chosen pre-
cisely in order to avoid the natural configuration of the molecules; the strands are 
nearly impossible to work with when wrapped up in knots around themselves. 
Such molecular configurations matter.  They define the physical character-
istics, and hence the biological function, of the molecules.  The primary sequence 
is important because it is a key factor in defining the molecule’s secondary and ter-
tiary configurations; it is necessary to molecular function, but not sufficient.  Mov-
  
21. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
22. See KREBS ET AL., supra note 9, at 8–9. 
23. Id. at 9. 
24. Id. at 197–98; WATSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 170–74. 
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ing the substance out of the cell inevitably alters it in ways not reflected by the 
primary sequence. 
The Solicitor General’s office, arguing against the patentability of gDNA in 
oral argument to the Federal Circuit, suggested a “magic microscope” analogy: 
that if one could use a magic microscope to examine native DNA, one would find 
naturally occurring in cells the identical sequence to the Myriad gDNA.25  Judge 
Lourie’s analysis, which relied on the covalent bonds missing in the gDNA mole-
cule, is in effect an answer to the government’s “magic microscope” argument, 
recognizing that it is clearly wrong.  But the differences are not limited to the 
sequence’s connection to the rest of the chromosomal strand.  If one could in fact 
microscopically—actually nanoscopically—scrutinize the native DNA molecule 
and compare it to either the cDNA or the excised gDNA sequence in a test tube, 
one would not see the same thing at all.  The molecule found suspended in buffer 
in a test tube simply is not the molecule coiled, knotted, and intertwined within 
the cell. 
For small molecules, essentially this same insight regarding the three di-
mensional aspect of molecules was the basis of the In re Papesch revolution in pa-
tent law’s nonobviousness criterion more than fifty years ago.26  Prior to the Papesch 
decision, courts had routinely held that it was obvious to add standard moieties to 
known families of molecules, for example adding an additional hydroxyl or car-
bonyl group to known molecules.27  The obviousness rationale was based on the 
routine extension of known two-dimensional molecular formulae.  Alkanes, al-
kenes, alcohols, esters, and other more complex families of organic molecules are 
constructed as a regular array of sequential molecular extensions that are typically 
represented on paper as predictable chemical structures.  Adding an additional 
known moiety to a known molecular structure in a routine family sequence was 
considered to be an obvious extension of the art. 
But this presumption ignored the reality that molecules in fact exist in three 
dimensions, not merely in a two-dimensional depiction.  The configuration de-
fined by a predictable addition to the known formula often resulted not in the ex-
pected two-dimensional extension of the formula, but rather in an unpredictable 
three-dimensional physical structure with unpredictable new characteristics.  The 
Papesch decision recognized the three-dimensional reality of small molecule struc-
  
25. AMP II, 689 F.3d at 1326. 
26. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
27. See Bruce M. Collins, The Forgotten Chemistry of the Hass-Henze Doctrine, 44 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
284 (1962). 
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ture, and held that such unexpected characteristics rendered the “predictable” ex-
tension of the known molecule nonobvious.28 
Recognizing the structural character of DNA sequences requires much the 
same conceptual reorientation.  Even were we to credit the AMP trial judge’s view 
of informational equivalence between the sequences of cellular and laboratory 
DNA, this accounts for only the information seen in a two-dimensional depic-
tion—the base pairs represented by combinations of the letters “ATCG” in a 
textbook, or in a patent.  But the information carried by the three-dimensional 
secondary and tertiary configurations of the molecules in a human cell as op-
posed to in the laboratory was certainly quite different.  Putting the most charita-
ble reading on the judge’s view, one would need to say that the informational 
content of the molecules is effectively the same, or that the pertinent information-
al content is the same. 
Of course, we might wish to say that as a matter of patent law we only care 
about the sequence of nucleic acid residues and, that we consider differences in 
configuration, context, and definition for isolated DNA to be for some reason 
inconsequential.  There are perhaps arguments for doing so, but that is a choice 
of policy; not an outcome dictated by the state of nature.  There is nothing in the 
natural order of the universe that demands such a focus, or that somehow declares 
that the nucleotide sequence of the molecule is a natural consideration while its 
other structural characteristics are inconsiderable or unnatural. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, many of the briefs filed in the AMP case tend to go on as if 
our view of the universe—and of the patent system—is predestined, rather than a 
creative human endeavor.  Even more unfortunately, some of the worst offenses 
in this regard are advanced by scientists or scientific societies.  But as I have shown 
here the definition of gene is a human, not a natural, construct, and that the phys-
ical properties of DNA molecules are necessarily altered to some degree from 
their native state anytime they are the subject of human investigation. 
Indeed, having here taken a hard look at the characteristics of the contested 
molecules in the AMP case, one wonders whether the most sensible course is to 
simply abandon the product of nature exercise altogether.  At its endpoints, the 
doctrine either proves everything or proves nothing.  Either everything is a prod-
uct of nature—drawn from and existing in the world—or nothing is a product of 
nature—having been intellectually and socially constructed by human cognition. 
  
28. Harold C. Wegner, Foreword, 6 APLA Q.J. 253, 253 (1978). 
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This is not to say that the product of nature doctrine is utterly without 
content or, at least, that a proper formulation of it need not be.  If the universe will 
not tell us outright what we ought to consider natural or inventive, how do we de-
cide what items fit these categories?  We look to the policy work that the doctrine 
is intended to do.  The proper criterion has been articulated by the Supreme Court 
in the related context of laws or principles of nature: “Phenomena of nature, 
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are 
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”29 
Such tools are essential to any technical progress; granting exclusive rights in 
such fundamental and necessary concepts would likely impede rather than pro-
mote innovation.  Similarly, if the product of nature doctrine stands for anything, 
it is surely a shorthand for the parallel concept that there may be some materials 
so fundamental to further inventive activity that restricting them through grants of 
exclusive rights would prove detrimental to innovation.  At the same time, there 
is nearly universal agreement that patents are intended to reward inventive activi-
ty by means of exclusive rights.30  Failure to provide such rights could deter invest-
ment in the development or acquisition of fundamental materials. 
Thus, the product of nature question is not a question of ontology, but a 
question of epistemology: What do we know or hope to know about a certain 
material to promote the progress of science and the useful arts?  There will be a 
fine line between enabling access to required tools and undersupplying them.  
Drawing the line is purely a matter of public policy informed by economic reality 
and technical practice.  The label “product of nature” does not tell us where that 
line lies, nor does the fact that a given tool was extracted at some level from mate-
rial substance.  In the end, the label product of nature is a conclusion rather than 
a criterion, and no substitute for the hard policy choice entailed in the Supreme 
Court’s question in AMP v. Myriad. 
  
29. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
30. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 66 (2009) (summarizing the dominant policy justifications for patent law). 
